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RECENT LEGISLATION FOR THE RELIEF OF
MORTGAGE DEBTORS
AN abnormal demand for the liquidation of debts is one of the most serious
consequences of a period of depression. Its effects are visited upon the
mortgagor with double-barreled severity. A scarcity of available funds
brings widespread default, both of interest and principal, and so leads to
an increasing number of foreclosures. These forced sales, in combination
with other factors, reduce the value of real estate to such an extent that
the defaulting mortgagor not only loses his land but also remains liable
upon a large deficiency judgment. This is the situation, aggravated by
the increase in the relative value of the dollar since 1929, in which the
mortgagor has found himself in recent months.1 And so long as this process
1. The total value of urban and rural mortgages outstanding at the close
of 1932 is estimated at $45,000,000,000, or $3,000,000,000 less than in 1929. Total
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of liquidation continues uncontrolled and unregulated, the more depressed
the market for real estate must become, followed in turn by still more
foreclosures and still further depressed prices. Both courts and legislatures
have, in these circumstances, been alert to discover means of relieving
mortgage debtors.
Court relief, apart from legislative action, encounters difficulty in the
contractual agreement of the mortgagor that upon default the mortgagee
may force a sale of the property and may have a deficiency judgment for
the amount by which the debt exceeds the proceeds of sale. Generally, a
lack of competitive bidding has not been regarded as sufficient to justify
a court in setting a minimum price before sale, nor mere inadequacy of
price sufficient for refusing confirmation after sale.2 In past depressions,
the fact that "times were hard," or "money scarce," or "the market un-
propitious," has afforded no basis for disturbing normal procedure.3 But
in the already famous case of Surbig State Bank v. Giese, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin recently declared that, "in the light of the present
emergency, and because of the present inadequacy of a judicial sale to
establish a fair value for the security," a court of equity has power without
the aid of statute to relieve mortgage debtors of liability upon deficiency
decrees. The court indicated three methods by which this might be ac-
national income, on the other hand, has fallen from $85,000,000,000 to $36,000,-
000,000 during the same period. The great bulk of farm mortgages was
contracted when the general price level was about twice, and the farm price
level nearly four times, as high as in 1932. Today's dollar is worth 571, cents
more than the dollar of 1929, which means that 6 per cent interest agreed upon
then is worth 9.45 per cent now. Cash income of farmers, after deducting
production expenses, declined 72 per cent in three years. In ten years land
values have dropped 66 per cent. For statistics and discussion, see Holden, Tho
Menace of Mortgage Debts (1933) 166 HARPEnS 575, 576; Johnson, Debt and
the Devil (1933) 22 YALE REviEw 450; Stein, Home Owners, Unite! (1933) 74
NEw REPuBLic 35; Jennings and Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculturo
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 878, 887, n. 21; Duffus, Our Burden of Internal Debt; An
Analysis of the Problem, N. Y. Times, May 2, 1933, § 1, at 6; Department of
Agriculture's Annual Estimate of Farm Income, N. Y. Herald Tribune, May
9, 1933, at 12.
Estimates of the number of foreclosures during the last three years reach
as high as half a million. Holden, svpra. In Cook County, Illinois, the number
of foreclosures commenced increased from 3,852 in 1929 to 15,332 in 1932.
Carey, Mortgage Foreclosures in Cook County (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 275. Fore-
closure and bankruptcy sales of farm property for the country as a whole in-
creased from 27 per cent of the total number of transfers in 1928 to 37 per cent
in 1932. N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 8, 1933, at 5. In relation to the number
of defaults, however, the number of foreclosures has not been large. Ibid.
2. 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2140; Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960.
3. Nebraska Loan and Trust Co. v. Hamer, 40 Neb. 281, 58 N. W. 695 (1894)
(sale confirmed) ; McGowan v. Sandford, 9 Paige 290 (N. Y. 1841) (postponement
of date of sale refused); Muller v. Bayly, 62 Va. 521 (1871) (injunction against
proposed sale denied).
4. 246 N. W. 556 (Wis. 1933); noted in (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960.
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complished. The trial court miiht fix an upset price before the foreclosure
sale, or failing this, either it might decline to confirm a sale where the bid
is "substantially inadequate," or upon application for confirmation it might
conduct a hearing to establish the value of the property and as a condition
to confirmation require that such value be credited upon the foreclosure
judgment. Trial courts in various parts of the country have indicated their
willingness to follow the lead of the Wisconsin court in the Giese case,5
but the traditional view that such questions of policy should be left to the
determination of the legislatures will probably lead many courts of appellate
jurisdiction to a contrary conclusion. 6
Recent legislation, both pending and enacted, reveals a wide variety of
attack upon the mortgage problem. Most of the measures considered are
designed either to give the debtor more time, or to relieve him of liability
upon deficiency judgments, or to extend the period after sale within which
he may redeem his property. Laws granting mortgagors outright moratoria
have been proposed in a few states,7 but measures accomplishing virtually
the same result through various procedural devices are more general.
Considerable relief may be afforded the mortgagor by allowing him several
months within which to file his answer in foreclosure proceedings. 8 There-
after, additional delay may be provided by statutes authorizing prolonged
continuances, 9 or directing that no sale of the debtor's property shall be
had until a reasonable time has elapsed after judgment,10 or even until such
5. See First Union Trust and Savings Bank v. Division State Bank, Circuit
Court of Cook County, illinois, decision by Fisher, J., April 1, 1933; Berry,
Vice Chancellor of New Jersey Court of Chancery, as quoted in N. Y. Times,
May 25, 1933, at' 7; Schmuck, Judge of New York Supreme Court, as quoted in
N. Y. Times, April 7, 1933, at 21.
6. Several courts have already so held. First National Bank v. Cahill, 160
Atl. 649 (N. J. Eq. 1932); Roberson v. Matthews, 200 N. C. 241, 156 S. E. 496
(1931); Commonwealth Bank and Trust Co. v. MacDonell, 49 S. W. (2d) 525
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
7. Mass. H. B. no. 1254 (1933) (all foreclosure suits to be stayed until the
executive shall declare that "the emergency creating the necessity for this legis-
lation no longer exists"); N. H. H. B. no. 401 (moratorium for one year).
8. Ark. Acts (1933) no. 21, approved February 9, 1933 ("An act for the
relief of the congested dockets of the chancery courts" providing, among other
things, that answers in foreclosure proceedings shall not be due for three months) ;
Okla. S. B. no. 76 (1933), approved March 7, 1933 (answers not to be due for
nine months).
9. Ariz. H. B. no. 167 (1933), approved March 4, 1933; Iowa H. F. no. 193,
effective Feb. 9, 1933; Okla. H. Roll no. 600 (1933), approved March 2, 1933.
Similar provisions have been suggested in other states. Ill. H. B. no. 420
(1933); Mich. It. B. no. 267 (1933); R. I. S. B. no. 92 (1933).
10. A bill introduced in the Wisconsin legislature this year allows a reason-
able time, but in no event beyond March 1, 1938; time would be granted upon
such terms as the court might determine; and defaults in payments of taxes,
interest or insurance would not of themselves be cause for appointment of a
receiver.
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time as "will insure, if possible, a fair price" being received." Statutes
which seek to cut down deficiency decrees are equally diverse in their
methods. The Idaho legislature has prohibited altogether the tahing or
enforcement of such judgments in the case of purchase money mortgages.' 2
For the most part, however, legislators have resorted to procedure such as
that suggested in the Giese case. A Kansas statute enacts the procedure
there adopted, virtually without change.13 A New Jersey bill, providing
that foreclosure sales shall not be confirmed "unless the bid shall equal the
value of the mortgaged premises," declares that the amount of th - debt
shall be prima facie evidence of that value; 14 while an Arkansas statute
makes the amount of the debt conclusive evidence of the property's value,
and requires the plaintiff to bid a sum equal to the debt, interest and costs
before the sale will be confirmed. 15 And a statute in Arizona provides that
a mortgagee may have a deficiency judgment only if he proves that "at the
time the note and mortgage, or deed of trust, were executed, the real
property was not of a value in excess of the amount remaining due upon
the note." 16
The foregoing statutes, together with those extending the period of
redemption,17 are open to the serious constitutional objection that they
impair the obligations of the mortgage contracts. The contract clause Is
was included in the federal Constitution for the very purpose of protecting
creditors from debtor-relief legislation.19 Recognizing this, courts in
earlier periods of economic depression frequently refused to sustain statutes
similar to the present mortgage relief measures. An early statute allowing
debtors to satisfy their obligations by instalment payments was held to be
invalid; 20 and laws forbidding foreclosure sales unless the amount bid
should equal an appraised valuation of the property or some specified per-
centage thereof,2' or directly restricting the mortgagee's right to a de-
11. Ariz. Session Laws (1933) no. 21, approved February 9, 1933.
12. An act so providing was approved Feb. 9, 1933.
13. See KANS. JuD. COUNCm BuLL. for April, 1933, at 6-10.
14. N. J. S. B. no. 135 (1933).
15. Ark. Acts (1933) no. 57, effective Feb. 25, 1933.
16. Ariz. H. B. no. 115 (1933), approved March 18, 1933.
17. In Wisconsin the usual one-year period has been extended to two years,
but in no event beyond January 1, 1936, provided the person entitled to redeem
"shall pay all insurance premiums as provided in the mortgage and all taxes
on the mortgaged property accruing after such judgment (of foreclosure),
before they become delinquent, and shall also pay on or before the expiration
of one year from the date of such judgment, one year's interest thereon." Wis.
Laws (Special Session, 1931-32) c. 29, § 7.
18. Art. 1, § 10.
19. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HARV.
L. REv. 1061, 1068.
20. Jacobs v. Smallw6od, 63 N. C. 112 (1869) (debts made payable in four
annual instalments).
21. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (U. S. 1843) (law prohibiting sale for
less than two thirds of appraised value held unconstitutional); McCracken v.
Hayward, 2 How. 608 (U. S. 1844) (same).
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ficiency judgment,22 or extending the period of redemption,23 all met a
similar fate when applied to prior mortgage contracts. But when courts
desired to reach a contrary conclusion, an escape from the Constitution's
prohibition was readily found in Chief Justice Marshall's distinction between
laws which impair the "obligations" of contracts and those which merely
modify the "remedies" given to enforce the obligations. 24 In spite of the
contract clause, therefore, a considerable body of moratory legislatin has
been sustained by the state courts. For example, a Georgia statute of 1807
suspending the issuance of civil process 25 for a limited period and intended
"to alleviate the condition of debtors" was sustained,20 as was also a Wis-
consin statute providing that defendants in actions to foreclose mortgages
should have six months within which to file answers and that property
should not be sold after judgment except upon six months notice.2 7 And
several state courts upheld laws giving debtors additional time by changing
or delaying court terms. 28 But the obscurity of the distinction between
"obligation" and "remedy" is indicated by the conclusion of the courts
that laws suspending the issuance of execution on civil judgments are such
drastic alterations of remedial rights as to diminish substantive rights and
so to be unconstitutional. 29 Clearly, the theory that statutory modifications
22. The statute need not completely abolish the recovery of such a judg-
ment in order to be open to attack as unconstitutional; it may provide only
that such a judgment cannot be recovered in proceedings to foreclose, leaving
open the right of the mortgagee to proceed in a subsequent action at law
for the balance, or to sue on the note or other evidence of debt in the first
instance without regard to his security. Cf. Burrows v. Vanderbergh, 69 Nob.
43, 95 N. W. 57 (1903). A law construed to limit the right to enforce judg-
ments on debts for which mortgage security has been given to tho property
mortgaged has been held invalid even as to contracts made after its passage,
as an undue restraint upon freedom of contract. Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash.
537, 52 Pac. 333 (1898). Of course, the parties may contract voluntarily with
reference to the property alone. Weikel v. Davis, 109 Wash. 97, 186 Pac. 823
(1919).
23. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (U. S. 1843); Howard v. Bugbeo, 24
How. 461 (U. S. 1860); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 129 (1895); Malone
v. Roy, 134 Cal. 344, 66 Pac. 313 (1901); State v. Hurlburt, 93 Ore. 34, 182
Pac. 169 (1919).
24. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200 (U. S. 1819).
25. Except for trial of the right to property.
26. Grimball v. Ross, T. U. P. Charlt. 175 (Ga. 1808).
27. Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559 (1859).
28. Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77 (1866) (first term after commencement of
action to be return term only, second term to be appearance and pleading term,
and third term to be trial term; in city courts of civil jurisdiction six months
to elapse between terms); Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Mete. 566 (Ky. 1861) (re-
pealing all laws requiring courts to hold terms, except for trial of criminal
and penal causes, for seven months); Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo. 205 (1860)
(statute similar to that considered in Ex parte Pollard, supra).
29. Hudspeth and Co. v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389 (1869) (no execution to issue
until one year after treaty of peace in Civil War); Jones v. Crittenden, 4
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of "remedies" do not also deprive creditors of substantive rights is un-
tenable. Any relief measure which does not substantially modify the
debtors' obligations fails of its purpose. Chief Justice Marshall's distinction
is therefore wholly inadequate as a test of constitutionality.20
Unless, therefore, courts in the present depression are more influenced
by social and economic conditions than they have been in the past, it sems
clear that much of the recent legislation for the relief of mortgagors will
be declared unconstitutional. 31  The decision of the Michigan court this
spring in Thompson, v. Stack 32 indicates something of the courts' present
uncertainty upon the question. The Michigan legislature, for the express
purpose of relieving tax delinquents of the sale of their property, forbade
the auditor general to publish descriptions of land scheduled so to be sold 3
A newspaper publisher, claiming a contract with the auditor general for
the publication of such descriptions, sought a writ of mandamus to require
the auditor general to perform his contract, alleging that the statute was
unconstitutional because it impaired the contracts of governmental units
with persons who had loaned them money and who held their notes. The
court, holding that the petitioner had a contract entitling him to seek the
N. C. 50 (1812) (executions stayed for a limited period); Barnes v. Barnez,
8 Jones 366 (N. C. 1861) (no execution to issue until otherwise provided by
law) ; Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 68S, 712, 713 (1868) (statute similar to
that considered in Hudspeth and Co. v. Davis, supra). Contra: Chadwick
v. Moore, 8 Watts & Serg. 49 (Pa. 1844) ("emergency measure" suspending
execution for three weeks sustained, the court denying "that a State Legislature
is incompetent to relieve the public from the pressure of sudden distress by
arresting a general sacrifice of property by the machinery of the lave').
Statutes staying for a reasonable time all actions against persons engaged in
military or naval service have generally been sustained. Note (1930) 9
A. L. R. 6, 11.
In Cutts and Johnson v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 350 (1868), a Georgia statute which
provided that juries should have the power to "reduce the amount of the debt
according to the equities of each case," and which made the amount of the
debtor's property upon the faith of which credit was extended him competent
evidence, was sustained on the ground that it acted only on the creditor's
remedy.
30. It is worthy of note that the constitutional prohibition is against "any
law impairing the obligation of contracts." It can make no difference under
what name the injury is done. See Warner, J., dissenting in Cutts and Johnson
v. Hardee, supra note 29, at 381, 387. Chief Justice Marshall himself, even
while-making his distinction, was careful to recognize that a change in remedy
might impair the obligation of a contract. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat.
122, 207 (U. S. 1819).
31. A district court in Texas has recently held unconstitutional a moratorium
law by which the legislature of that state proposed to give the district courts
discretionary power to postpone foreclosures for six months on a showing by
the land owner that he was unable to pay and that the property would bring
less than its actual value if sold. N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 20, 1933, at 0.
32. 247 N. W. 360 (Mich. 1933), decided March 1.
33. Mich. Pub. Acts (1933) no. 2.
mandamus order,34 concluded that the governmental units had borrowed
"on the faith of the collection of delinquent taxes, and the sale of lands to
realize such taxes, under laws existing at the time the notes were issued
and sold. A law which impairs the means of realizing upon the contracts
of the governmental units as agreed impairs the obligation of such con-
tracts." 35 The writ was accordingly granted. Curiously enough, however,
the reporter adds'a footnote that "Under subsequent order of court, writ
of mandamus was not issued, in view of existing emergency, and it being
a discretionary writ."
In the existence of the emergency which induced the Michigan court to
act contrary to its own decision lies the strongest argument for the con-
stitutionality of the mortgage legislation under consideration. The titles
of these various measures proclaim the existence of a period of "extreme
financial depression," and the necessity for affording temporary relief to
mortgage debtors. Reliance is thus invited upon the doctrine of the
"Emergency Rent Cases," 36 in which an emergency was held by the Supreme
Court to lend validity to legislation which otherwise could not have been
sustained.37 A crisis sufficiently serious to necessitate resort to martial
law for the preservation of order should certainly warrant the application
of this doctrine to statutes for the relief of mortgagors. At least where
such statutes are expressly limited in operation to a reasonable and definite
time,38 therefore, their constitutionality should be affirmed.
Of the various forms of mortgage relief legislation that have been pro-
posed, a general moratorium on all foreclosures, applying to defaults in the
payment of principal and interest alike and prescribing an iron rule for
all cases without regard to the circumstances of the parties, seems least
34. The court in laboring to demonstrate that petitioner had a contract
giving him standing in court appears to have gone out of its way to indicate
its views upon the constitutional question presented.
35. 247 N. W. at 371.
36. Block" v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1920); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Felderman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258
U. S. 242 (1922). These cases involved the validity of legislation enacted by
Congress and by the legislature of New York declaring an emergency housing
situation in the District of Columbia and in New York. For discussion, see
Boyd, Rent Regulation under the Police Power (1921) 19 MICH. L. REV. 599;
Wickersham, The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws
(1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 301; Notes (1921) 5 CAL. L. Rv. 337; (1921)
19 MICH. L. REv. 869; (1921) 5 MINN. L. REV. 472.
37. The Court indicated in Chastelton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543
(1924), that the rent laws would cease to operate when the emergency ceased
to exist.
38. Such a time limitation was stressed in the Rent Cases. See Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 157 (1920). In earlier times courts have sometimes held
that mortgage relief legislation was void for indefiniteness if a time limitation
was not expressed; e.g., Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313, 318 (1863). But
whether expressed or not, a time limitation upon the operation of such statutes
must almost necessarily be intended; such restrictive legislation as a permanent
policy would drive capital from the mortgage field altogether.
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likely to effect a socially and economically desirable solution of the problem.
There are many mortgage debtors who can afford to pay something; there
are creditors who cannot afford to remain unpaid.39 In determining whether
final settlement is to be left in abeyance in any case, the needs of the
mortgagee as well as those of the mortgagor should be considered, and
some protection of the mortgagee's interests should be afforded in the
interim. From this standpoint, a measure of the type recently enacted by
the Arizona legislature 40 offers the most satisfactory form of relief. The
statute provides in substance that in all pending foreclosure actions and
in actions subsequently instituted the court may, upon application of either
party and unless good cause is shown to the contrary, order a continuance
for a period of not more than two years 41 from the effective date of the
act. If a continuance is ordered,2 the court shall make an order for the
possession of the land at fair rental terms, giving preference to the present
owners; furthermore, the court is required to determine the application of
the rents, income and proceeds from the land,43 and to make such provisions
for the preservation of the property during the period of the continuance
39. It has been estimated that about 15 per cent of all farm mortgages are
held by farmers themselves, while other individuals hold an additional 15
per cent, the remaining 70 per cent being held by federal land banks, joint
stock land banks, commercial banks, mortgage companies, and insurance com-
panies. For discussion of the effect upon these mortgagees of general relief
laws, see (1933) 136 NATION 193. Farm mortgages represent only 9 per cent
of the total investments of insurance companies at present; urban mortgages
form another 20 per cent of their investments. Commercial and savings banks
hold 35 per cent of all urban mortgages, and building and loan associations
hold an additional 25 per cent. These investments constitute more than half
the earning assets of savings banks and building and loan associations. N. Y.
Herald Tribune, May 8, 1933, at 5.
40. The Arizona act, and also the similar ones enacted in Iowa and Oklahoma
and proposed in Illinois, Michigan and Rhode Island, are cited suprz note 9.
41. The Iowa law provides that proceedings may be stayed until March 1,
1935, or so long as the act is in effect. The Nebraska law is similar, as are
also the bills in Michigan and Rhode Island.
42. The Oklahoma law authorizes a court to grant continuances in all
foreclosure proceedings, and requires the court to make such an order if the
mortgagor will agree to pay or secure the interest and taxes due, plus a
reasonable rental, and if the land is of sufficient value to satisfy the lien with
costs. The court may appoint a receiver (except when the land is a homestead)
to preserve, rent and operate, or to prevent waste upon the property. The
bill proposed in Illinois provides for the appointment of a receiver during
the continuance, and directs him to enter into a written lease with the owner
for one year requiring the latter to pay taxes and a reasonable rental. The
lease may be extended in the discretion of the court, but not beyond July 1,
1935. A bill (H. B. 473) similar to the Iowa and Nebraska legislation has
also been presented in Illinois.
43. In distributing the rents and proceeds of the property, taxes, insurance,
cost of maintenance and upkeep are to be paid in the order of priority named,
and the balance as the court may direct.
as may seem proper. In effect the statute contemplates a fair temporary
arrangement between the parties when circumstances make relief for one
or both of them necessary. It is possible, however, that the individual
treatment which would be necessary for each case under such a statute
would impose an unduly heavy volume of litigation upon the trial courts.
D.E. C.
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS FOR LABOR UNIONS
RACKETEER control of labor unions, inflicting many abuses upon the rank
and file of union members, invites an enlarged scope of judicial inter-
ference in the unions' internal organizations which would in many circum-
stances prove incompatible with the unions' legitimate functions, The
recent action of a New York court in appointing receivers to manage the
affairs of Local 306 of the moving picture operators' union 1 is a warn-
ing of the drastic form which such interference may take. While the
New York court's appointments were vacated upon appeal,2 they had
meanwhile been followed by a New Jersey court's decision placing sev-
eral local building-trades unions in the hands of receivers.3
The factual background of the New York decision is probably repre-
sentative. In 1926, one Sam Kaplan was elected president of Local 306.
Internal disputes arose quickly and furiously. Charges were made by
minority members at the meeting of the union and filed with the officers
and General Executive Board of the International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators, from which
Local 306 held its charter. It was alleged that Kaplan had discriminated
in wage scale contracts in favor of exhibitors who purchased supplies
from Kaplan's own concern, the Sam Kaplan Manufacturing Company,
and that he had in other ways used his position as president of the local
for the personal benefit of himself and the other officers, to the detriment
of the local and its members. Kaplan was also accused of mismanagement
and illegality in the handling of the funds of the union, it being claimed
that approximately $800,000 was collected annually and spent without
proper bookkeeping records, and that vast sums of this money were unac-
counted for. Further, Kaplan was said to have discriminated among union
members in the assignment of positions, and to have threatened violence to
some of them and incited assaults by others. It appears that between
October, 1929, and October, 1931, at least twelve members of Local 306
were expelled or suspended and fined 4 for opposition to Kaplan's leader-
1. Kaplan v. Elliot, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
2. Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 24, 1933, at 456, 464 (mom. App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1933), N. Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1933, at 17; noted in (1933)
46 HAnv L. REv. 1037.
3. The New York World-Telegram, Jan. 19, 1933, at 16.
4. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931) ; Rubin and Lanzotto
v. Kaplan, Smith v. Kaplan, and Wood v. Kaplan, all in Supreme Court, Kings
County (all of these expulsions and fines have been held void and set aside).
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ship. Expulsion of several members followed their cooperation in bring-
ing, or in seeking the members' support for, an action in which the
officers of the union were accused of wrong-doing and in which an account-
ing of union funds was requested; similar treatment was accorded
several members for forcing some of the union's officers to answer assault
charges in proceedings which were subsequently dismissed.
5 Kaplan is
said to have refused to reinstate these members even when their rein-
statement was ordered by the courts.0
Despite the gravity of these charges, the International Alliance de-
clined to interpose in the affairs of Local 306, preferring to respect local
autonomy. The American Federation of Labor also refused to inter-
fere. Thereafter, however, a series of scathing articles and editorials
in a New York newspaper 7 gave considerable publicity to the state of
internal affairs in Local 306; and in December, 1931, Kaplan and twenty-
one officers of the local were indicted for criminal coercion and con-
spiracy in connection with their union activities.
8 Spurred on by these
events, and by the American Federation of Labor's threatened revocation
of its charter, the International Alliance in September, 1932, directed its
Executive Board to conduct an investigation into conditions in Local 306.
After extended hearings, the Executive Board on November 28, 1932,
notified Kaplan and his ,associate officers of their ouster, and directed
them to turn over the assets and books of the local to a committee ap-
pointed by the Board.0 Within a few days Kaplan brought suit to
prevent the International from improperly ousting him, seeking a tem-
porary injunction against any immediate interference in the affairs of
the local. The court, denying the temporary injunction, set down the
trial of the action for an early date and ordered an immediate election
of new officers. Representatives of the International Alliance, sub-
mitting further affidavits showing the turbulent condition of the local,
urged the court to postpone the election until after the trial.
10 There-
upon the court, on its own motion, entered a second order substituting for
Ruddoch (later replaced by Polin, later replaced by Thide) v. Kaplan, pend-
ing in Supreme Court, Queens County.
5. See Latelton v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, New York County;
Tyborowski v. Kaplan, pending in Supreme Court, Kings County.
6. Other charges filed against Kaplan included discrimination in dues
charged to out-of-town card men, in direct violation of the constitution and
by-laws of the International Alliance, and employment of non-union labor in
the Sam Kaplan Manufacturing Company.
7. The New York World-Telegram published a series of articles commenc-
ing in May, 1931, and continuing through 1932.
3. Matter of public record. On March 9, 1933, Kaplan and several of the
officers were convicted. People v. Kaplan (unreported). See N. Y. Times,
March 10, 1933, at 18.
9. As to the power of the International Alliance to order such transfer,
see note 30, infra.
10. Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 5, 1933, at 57 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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an immediate election the appointment of three receivers "of the property,
real and personal, things in action and effects of every kind and nature"
of Local 306, and directing the receivers "to take possession of said prop-
erty, to collect and receive, hold and preserve, and protect the same and
the proceeds thereof, and maintain and conduct the affairs of Local 306
* * * " This order was modified by the court to provide that a committee
of two persons, one a member of the local and the other a representative
of the International, should actually conduct the operating affairs of the
local, but the committee was made subject to the supervision of the re-
ceivers, and the latter retained full control over the funds of the union.
In vacating the appointment of these receivers, the Appellate Division 1
required the International Alliance to post a $500,000 bond securing the
funds of the local, and ordered an immediate trial of the action.12
Sweeping injunctions in connection with strikes, restrictions on picket-
ing and boycotts, and judicial protection of "yellow dog" contracts, have
caused labor unions to be wary of judicial interference in their affairs.
Consequently, it has become a common rule among labor unions that, in
the settlement of internal disputes, all available remedies within the union
be exhausted before recourse is had to the courts. "Provisions In the
by-laws of labor associations designed to bring disputes to arbitration
before internal tribunals have, in general, been enforced by the courts.'5
Numerous judicial exceptions, however, have lessened the efficacy of such
requirements. For example, prior appeal within the association is not
necessary if the internal appellate body meets very infrequently,' 4 or if
the matter is not within the association's power,15 or if, in the most
common type of suit, a wrongfully expelled member seeks only damages
and not reinstatement.'( Many unions have gone so far as to provide
in their by-laws that the decisions of their own tribunals shall be final
in any dispute. Some courts have respected such provisions and have per-
11. Kaplan v. Elliot, supra note 2.
12. At the trial subsequently held, Justice Miller ruled that Kaplan had
been properly ousted. Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 31, 1933, at 612 (Sup.
Ct. 1933). Question might be raised whether the court had the right to enter-
tain the suit until Kaplan had exhausted his remedies within the union. See
notes 13 et seq., infra. After such trial, an election of officers was held and
associates of Kaplan were overwhelmingly defeated.
13. Supreme Council of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52, 25 N. E.
129 (1890); Harris v. Detroit Typographical Union, 144 Mich. 422, 108 N. W.
362 (1906); Powell v. United Association of Plumbers & Steamfitters, 240
N. Y. 616, 148 N. E. 728 (1925).
14. Kaplan v. Elliot, supra note 12; Broun v. Supreme Court I. 0. F.,
34 Misc. 556, 70 N. Y. Supp. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1901), aff'd, 66 App. Div. 259,
72 N. Y. Supp. 806 (4th Dep't 1901), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 132, 68 N. E. 145 (1903).
15. People v. Order of Foresters, 162 Ill. 78, 44 N. E. 401 (1896); Knights
of Pythias v. Eshholme, 59 N. J. L. 255, 35 AtI. 1055 (1896).,
16. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green,
210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923).
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mitted further appeal only in cases of fraud or duress, 17 although in sev-
eral early decisions by-laws completely ousting the courts of jurisdiction
were declared illegal.' 8
The courts themselves, moreover, usually express a definite reluctance
to interfere in the internal affairs of trade unions.10 But whether they
will take jurisdiction or not is entirely within their own discretion, for
there exists a corollary rule that relief should be afforded where property
rights, contracts or similar legal questions are involved.2 0 Thus, in the
usual case of alleged improper ouster of individual members, the courts
have generally consented to hear the complaint, and have sought to ascer-
tain whether or not the expulsion was wrongful. Three criteria are
employed: the expulsion must have been in accordance with the rules of
the union and the offense of the expelled member must be covered by
them; 21 the rules and proceedings must not have been contrary to natural
justice; 22 and the determinations must have been free from malice (bad
faith).2
The rapid spread of racketeering in labor unions has caused the number
of expulsions and suspensions to increase greatly. And with the develop-
ment in the strength of union organizations expulsion from an association
17. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So.
456 (1926); Long v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 155 Md. 265, 141 At]. 504
(1908); International Hod Carriers' Union, Local 426 v. International Hod
Carriers' Union, Local 502, 101 N. J. Eq. 474, 138 Atl. 532 (1927); Stevers
v. Blethen, 124 Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (1923). See Rubens v. Weber, N. Y.
L. J., Feb. 3, 1933 (wherein court refused to interfere with operation of inter-
nal machinery).
18. Supreme Council of Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, supra note
13; Reed v. Washington Insurance Co., 138 Mass. 572 (1885). Theze early
cases would probably be overruled in the light of the recent definitely favorable
reception of arbitration statutes. See Baum and Pressman, TIo Enforcement
of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts (1930) 8 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 238.
19. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930)
43 HARv. L. REv. 993.
20. Id. at 999.
21. Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 4; Lewis v. Wilson, 121 N. Y. 284, 24
N. E. 474 (1890); Matter of Koch, 257 N. Y. 318, 178 N. E. 545 (1931);
See Mintz, Trade Union Abuses (1932) 6 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 272; Note (1930)
30 CoL. L. RLv. 853.
22. Spayd v. Ringing Rock, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1931) (law of trade
union providing that member using his influence against legislative policies of
the union should be expelled, held void as violating member's constitutional
right of petition). Other rights which have been protected are: right to testify
in court against the interests of the union, Thompson v. Grand International
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S. W. 834
(1905); right to sue the union, Burke v. Monumental Division, 273 Fed. 707
(D. C. Md. 1919); Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, 161 N. E. 272 (1918).
23. See POUND, CASES ON EQUrrABLE RELEms AGAINsT DEFAL1AtION AND
INJURIES TO PERSONALI=Y (Chafee ed. 1930) 96 n.
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has come to mean for the worker loss of livelihood and inability to obtain
other employment. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, the
courts have been granting relief to ousted members with increasing fre-
quency. However, since the relief sought in these cases is only rein-
statement or damages, the result has not been to enlarge the scope of
judicial interference with the unions' internal affairs. Such limited
exercise of power by the courts is clearly desirable under present cir-
cumstances. The danger that it might exceed those limits could be over-
come by statute, as in, England,24 or by provisions in union by-laws
limiting the right of judicial relief to actions brought by individual
members seeking reinstatement. If even such safeguards were considered
insufficient, resort to the courts might generally be made available, as
in some unions today, only after all internal remedies have been exhausted,
and then, possibly, merely in cases where fraud or duress or other cir-
cumstances obviously have invalidated the determinations of the unions'
own tribunals.
Any extension of judicial interference, however, whereby the funds and
activities of labor organizations would be brought within the complete
supervision of the courts; should be vigorously opposed. In the instant
case, the appointment of receivers with the wide and discretionary powers
indicated above would have had this result. Precedents for placing labor
unions under any such sweeping control of receivers are very meagre
and the few cases which have raised the problem directly are clearly dis-
24. 34 & 35 VIcT. c. 31 (1871). This Trade Union Act of 1871 provided
that: "Sec. 4. Nothing in this Act shall enable any court to entertain any
legal proceedings instituted with the object of directly enforcing or recovering
damages for the breach of the following agreements, namely, . . .
"3. Any agreement for the application of the funds of a trade union,
"a. To provide benefits to members;
"b. To furnish contributions to any employer or workman not
a member of such trade union, in consideration of such employer or
workman acting in conformity with the rules or resolutions of such
trade union; or
"c. To discharge any fine imposed upon any person by sentence
of a court of justice."
This statute was deliberately enacted to meet the apprehension of the
English labor unions that they might be exposed to constant and harassing
litigation by disaffected members acting at the instance of employers and
unfriendly interests. WEBB, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISIX (rev. ed. 1920) 255.
At first, any suits to interfere with the internal affairs even though merely
for reinstatement or damages, were rejected under the above statute, but later
cases have whittled away the full protection. See Johnston v. Aberdeen Master
Plumbers Association, [1921] A. C. 62; Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of
Railway Servants, [1911] 1 Ch. 540. However, the English courts still refuse
to take any jurisdiction over union funds. Yorkshire Miners' Association v.
Howden, [1905] A. C. 256 (denied injunction to restrain purported misappli.
cation of union funds); Gozney v. Bristol, [1909] 1 K. B. 901; Burke v.
Amalgamated Society of Dyers, [1906] 2 K. B. 583 (latter two cases held
court would not interfere with use of union funds).
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tinguishable. An English court's refusal 25 to appoint a receiver at the
request of a single member of a union who had instituted an accounting
action, was based upon the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act.-g In
the only other closely analagous cases, property rights alone were involved
and the effect of the decisions would not have been to place the activities
of a going labor organization under external supervision. Thus, in one
case, receivers were appointed to take charge of the funds of a labor union
ordered to be dissolved,2 and in another, a judgment creditor sought a
receiver to take possession of the assets of a union.2  It is true that the
remedy of receivership is available to minority members of business asso-
ciations in the event of fraud or mismanagement, -3 but such cases do not
raise the peculiar problems inherent in similar control over labor organi-
zations.
The practical dangers to labor union activities and purposes which the
appointment of receivers with extensive supervisory powers would involve,
are many and formidable. The strength of a labor union depends essen-
tially upon the willingness of its members implicitly to obey the decisions
of the governing body. External control, and particularly control by the
courts, is naturally objectionable to the members. The effect of placing
the direction of union activities in the hands of receivers, therefore, would
be to demoralize the organization and to emasculate its power. Moreover,
since all the funds and all the current activities of the union would be
subject to the supervision and control of the court, collective agreements
could be authorized or abrogated by the court during the receivership
proceeding; and the effects of such action would extend beyond the period
of the receivership. Strikes might easily be broken by receivership actions
instituted by disaffected factions and fostered by employers involved
therein. Finally, during a vital strike, the activities of a union when
organized by court-appointed receivers, would not be of the same militant
character as when organized under the supervision of labor leaders.
The alternative to drastic judicial interference in the internal affairs
of labor unions is not chaos. Relief from the strangle-hold of racketeers
is quite possible from within. While local unions are permitted consider-
able autonomy, the by-laws and constitutions of both the locals and the
national organizations grant wide and discretionary powers to the national
body. The International Alliance, for example, could, under its powers,
investigate the affairs of Local 306, remove the officers if the charges
against them were proven, and'take jurisdiction and control over the
25. Sansom v. London & Provincial Union of Licensed Vehicle Workers,
36 T. L. R. 666 (K. B. 1920).
26. See note 24, supra.
27. Kealey v. Faulkner, 18 Ohio Dec. 498 (Cuyahoga C. P. 1907).
28. District No. 21, United Mine Workers of America v. Bourland, 169
Ark. 796, 277 S. W. 546 (1925).




assets and books of the local union pending the election of new officers.30
Theoretically, the American Federation of Labor, in which only the
national organizations have memberships, may not interfere in the affairs
of any particular national or local union unless first requested to do so.
But through publicity or its threat of ousting the national union, it could
easily cause investigations to be made and ultimately compel the elimina-
tion of racketeering. Unfortunately, the strength and prestige of the
national unions and of the American Federation of Labor have only
recently been brought to bear upon the outrageous conditions which have
been exposed in many locals.31 Regardless of any individual injury in
the interim, however, it seems clear that the ultimate form of reorgan-
ization of union affairs must come from within the unions and probably
be fostered by the rank and file of labor organizations.
LEE PRESSMAN t
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW YORK MINIMUM
WAGE LAW
SINCE the decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital 1 the facts of the case
for a minimum wage law have undergone a compelling change, and the
30. The constitution and by-laws of the International Alliance bestowed
the customary wide and discretionary powers upon the international president
and governing board. See. 10 of Art. 7 of the constitution provided: "The
International President shall have the power to authorize any members of the
Executive Board or International Representative to examine all books, papers,
etc. of any affiliated local whenever he may deem it necessary . .. " Section
11 of the same article provides: "Emergency cases. In case of any emer-
gency the International President shall have the power to suspend any law or
laws of the Alliance, or of any local union, provided he obtains the unanimous
consent of the members of the General Executive Board."
In several cases, by-laws of unions permitting, under specified conditions,
the national body to take control over the assets and books of the local, have
been held contrary to public policy and invalid. Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y.
112 (1857); Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232 (1891). Cf. State Council,
United American Mechanics v. Hotaling, 184 App. Div. 750, 171 N. Y. Supp.
(3d Dep't 1918). However, a contrary attitude seems to have been adopted
in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. William, 211 Ky. 638, 277 9. W. 500
(1925). The New, York court's affirmance of Kaplan's ouster and the taking
over of the local's funds and books indicates an adoption of the latter view.
31. Recent newspaper accounts report that the American Federation of
Labor is investigating racketeering in unions in New York City.
- Member of the New York Bar.
1. 261 U. S. 525 (1923). For a chronological discussion of state court
decisions treating of minimum wage legislation, see BAxER, PROTECTIva LABOR
LEGISLATION (1925) 79-99; and for the development of minimum wage laws
in the United States, see ARmSTRONG, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS (1932) 58-79;
BURNS, WAGES AND THE STATE (1926); Development of Minimum Wage Laws
in the United States, 1912 to 1927, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bulletin of the Women's
Bureau, No. 61 (1928); Crow, History of Legislative Control of Wages in
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effective demands 2 for such legislation have assumed imperative propor-
tions. According to a settled rule of constitutional law, therefore, that
case is no longer binding precedent 3 In 1923 a minimum wage law was
regarded as a humanitarian measure designed to prevent inordinate ex-
ploitation of labor.4 The issue was merely whether the state could compel
employers to pay a fair living wage.5 Recent economic trends, however,
have revealed a necessity for wage-fixing not appreciated at the time of
the Adkins decision.G It is now generally recognized that wage-cutting"-
threatens the stability of industrys Reduced wages mean decreased pur-
Wisconsin (1932) 16 MARQ. L. REV. 188; U. S. Daily, April 8-15, 1933, at 75,
86; id. May 20-27, 1933, at 29.
2. See telegram sent by President Roosevelt on April 12, 1933, to the
Governors of the thirteen principal industrial states urging the enactment
of minimum wage legislation comparable to the Eberhard-Wald Bill discussed
below. For comments by industrial and labor leaders on the necessity of
minimum wage legislation, see U. S. Daily, April 8-15, 1933, at 75; id. April
22-29, 1933, at 109; N. Y. Times, May 6, 1933; cf. also Sympocium, Do We
Need Minimum Wage Laws? (1933) 89 FORUMi 282.
3. "Underlying conditions of fact condition the constitutionality" of legis-
lation. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251
(1931); cf. Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U. S. 705 (1931); Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 52 Sup. Ct. 146 (1932); People
v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639 (1915) (see especially
pp. 410, 411, 412). See Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S.
249, 255 (1931), where a unanimous Court ruled that the burden of proving
the unconstitutionality of a statute rested upon the plaintiff, who must "set
forth in its complaint facts sufficient plainly to show the asserted invalidity.'
Cf. also Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 657; Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1101;
Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 262.
4. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 562 (1923). Cf. Broda, Minimum Wage
Legislation in Various Countries, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bulletin of Bureau of
Labor Statistics, No. 467 (1928) 4.
5. § 23 of the District of Columbia Act stated that the purpose of the
Act was "to protect the women and minors of the District from conditions
detrimental to their health and morals, resulting from wages which are in-
adequate to maintain decent standards of living; and the Act in each of its
provisions and in its entirety shall be interpreted to effectuate theze purposes."
6. THE N.w REPUBLIC, May 17, 1933, at 16, 17; ef. note 2, supra.
7. The extent to which wage-cutting has prevailed during the four years of
the depression is revealed by a recent study made by the National Industrial
Conference Board. Of 1,718 concerns which were studied in the leading fields
of business, 75.4% have reduced wage rates. SALARIES AND WAGE POLICY IN
THE DEPRESSlON (1932) 13. For the extent of wage cuts among "white col-
lar" women workers in New York City, see 10 INDUST2rAL BULLETIN, New
York (State) Dep't of Labor (1930-31) 191-193; and for women factory
workers, see Flynn, Starvation Wages (1933) 89 FORU= 327. Cf. note 8, infra.
8. The stabilizing effect on industry of a fair minimum wage standard has
persuaded the union operators of the Ohio and Western Pennsylvania bitumi-
nous fields to urge the federal government to fix a minimum wage scale for
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chasing power,9 and decreased purchasing power paralyzes trade. More-
over, unlimited ability to slash labor costs constitutes a vicious weapon
for unscrupulous competition. 10 These factors make minimum wage legis-
lation essential to any program for economic recovery.' And since the
the industry in order to offset the ruinous competition of the southern non-
union fields, enjoying cheaper labor costs and advantageous freight differen-
tials. N. Y. Times, May 3, 1933, at 19. Of. also the plan proposed by Senator
Hayden of the Committee on Mines and Mining, providing for the allotment
of production for domestic consumption and the establishmen of a minimum
wage level below which operators would be prevented from cutting. Ibid.
That the administration of a minimum fair wage exerts a salutary effect on
business through the elimination of "cut throat competition" between em-
ployers, reduces labor turnover, creates goodwill between employers and em-
ployees, increases efficiency of management and workers, and decreases in-
dustrial waste, has been amply demonstrated by the operation of the Cali-
fornia Minimum Wage statute. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 1. For state-
ments by business leaders and statistical data on the sound effects of its
operation, see brief in Gainer v. Industrial Welfare Commission of California
( ithdrawn from litigation), prepared by Felix Frankfurter and Miss Mary
Davison, and reprinted by the National Consumers' League (1926). See id. at
109-172 for an analysis of the beneficial effects of the Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts minimum wage laws; of. Broda, supra note 4, at 6, 51. See in general,
U. S. Daily, May 20-27, 1933, at 29.
9. From 1929 to 1931 the money incomes of employees in the major occu-
pations had fallen between 35% and 40%. In 1930 the decline amounted to
13% and in 1931 to about 20% more. In the first quarter of 1932 the incomes
derived from salaries and wages were still further reduced. "At the same time
the annual money earnings of American employees have been reduced by
about 35%, the cost of living has declined by no more than 15%." II RECENT
SociAL TRENDS (1933) 822, 823, 824. Cf. statement of liss Frances Perkins:
"the fixing of minimum fair wages in industries where earnings have fallen
below a 'fair value for services rendered' would result in increased purchasing
power." U. S. Daily, April 22-29, 1933, at 3.
10. See (1933) 23 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Stabilizing Industry
No. 1 Supp. 55-81; SOULE, WAGE ARBITRATION (1928); HAMILTON AND WRIGHT,
THE CASE OF BITUMINOUS COAL (1925); Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning
for Petroleum Production (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 33; Jennings and Sullivan,
Legal Planning for Agriculture (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 878; DUNN AND HARDY,
LABOR AND TEXTILEs (1931); TODES, LABOR AND LUMBER (1931). Cf. note 8,
supra.
11. Cf. provision of proposed Industrial Recovery Bill (t1. R. 5755) whereby
employers must apply the minimum wages "approved or prescribed by the
President" which are to be worked out by the collective agreement of labor
and employers if possible. See THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 31, 1933, at 57-58;
U. S. Daily, May 20-27, 1933, at 12, 13. At this time there are additional
compulsions for the enactment of a minimum wage law. While many of the
larger enterprises have reduced the wages of each employee, they have, until
recently, under a policy of spreading work, retained the greater number of
their employees, with the result that the total payroll average has not been
decreased proportionately to the average cut per worker. On the other hand,
the smaller firms have both decreased the wage per worker and the number
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wages paid women and children are subject to the most excessive reduc-
tions,' 2 a law similar to that declared unconstitutional in the Adkins case
is particularly vital.
The New York legislature has recently enacted such a law.13 It pro-
vides that on the petition of fifty or more residents of the State, or upon
the basis of information in the Department of Labor, the Industrial Com-
missioner or the Director of the Minimum Wage Division shall appoint
a wage board to recommend minimum fair wage rates for women and
minors in any industry concerning which complaint is made that "op-
pressive" 14 and "unreasonable" wages are being paid. A wage board is
of workers. Under the pressure of a deepening crisis and intensified com-
petition, the larger enterprises are now confronted with the necessity of adopt-
ing the policy of their sinaller competitors, and abandoning the spreading of
work in order to reduce wages. Slichter, Should Labor Be Deflated?, THEn
NEw REPUBLIC, May 3, 1933, at 329, 330. Moreover, since the federal govern-
ment is now attempting to stimulate buying through inflation of prices, an
outbreak of widespread and still more drastic wage cutting at this time would
seriously undermine the success of its program. A minimum wage statute
would serve to bridge the gap between real wages and inflationary commodity
prices.
12. See, in general, The Employment of Womcn in the Sewing Trades of
Connecticut, Preliminary Report, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bulletin of the Women's
Bureau, No. 97 (1932); HUTCHINS, YOUTH IN INDUSTRY (1930). For the
increase in child labor and home work in New York State since the depression,
see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM ISSIONER, 1931, New York State
Dep't of Labor, Leg. Doc. (1932) No. 21, at 10, 18, 19. In the clothing industry
of Connecticut and Rhode Island the number of workers between 16 and 17
years of age has increased by 123% and 283% respectively; in New Jersey the
increase was 81%; in Pennsylvania 62%; and in Massachusetts 52%. Monthly
Labor Review, U. S. Dep't of Labor, March, 1933, at 500. The availability of
a plentiful supply of cheap labor by women and children has led to the estab-
lishment of "runaway shops" working on a contract system and attended by
all the evils of sweating, low pay and long hours. An investigation made by
the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Commission has diEclosed that rates as
low as 10 cents, and in one ease, 5 cents an hour were paid to girl workers
in Fall River. Of 1,616 employees in 13 plants making women's apparel, 71%
earned less than $15 a week. Monthly Labor Revicw, supra, at 501. Wage-
cutting, moreover, affects women workers more directly than men worhers., A
comparison of cuts in New York City, for example, reveals that in the women's
clothing industry the wages of men have been cut 34%, the wages of women
40%. In the shoe industry, men factory workers have been cut 40%, women
workers 45%. In the candy industry men workers have suffered wage reduc-
tions of 23%, women 30%. The same percentages apply to the canning and
preserving industries. In industries outside New York City wage cuts have
forced women workers to the bare subsistence level. Flynn, supra note 7; cf.
Bilevitz, The Connectieut Needle Trades (1932) 135 NATION 475.
13. Eberhard-Wald Bill, approved by Governor Lehman May 1, 1933. N. Y.
Laws 1933, c. 584.
14. The. word is taken from the Wisconsin Oppressive Wage Act, Wis.
Stat. 1931, c. 104. See AMiSmoNG, supra note 1.
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to consist of three representatives of the employers in the industry under
investigation, three representatives of the employees, and three persons
representing the public. In determining a fair minimum wage the board
is required to differentiate and classify employments in any industry ac-
cording to the nature of the services rendered; it may also vary the wage
rates according to the different localities. Within sixty days of its incep-
tion the board is to submit its report and recommendations. If the
Commissioner accepts this report, he is to publish it with such additional
administrative regulations as he deems advisable, and thereafter hear-
ings are to be held at which all interested persons may present their
objections. The Commissioner will then enter a "directory" order, defining
the minimum fair wage for the industry investigated. Failure to comply
with the "directory" order will cause an employer's name to be published
in the newspapers, and continued disregard of the order will cause the
previous "directory" order to be made mandatory. Violation of the
mandatory order is punishable by fine or imprisonment. Moreover, at
the request of any woman or minor worker paid less than the minimum
fair wage rate under a mandatory order, the Commissioner may take an
assignment of the complaining employee's wage claim and bring action
against the employer for the amount due. After a minimum wage order
has been in effect for one year or more, it may be modified on the Com-
missioner's motion, or upon the petition of fifty or more residents of the
State. No appeal from the Commissioner's ruling on questions of fact
is permitted. However, review by the Industrial Board and the courts
is provided on questions of law included or embodied in a decision or
order of the Commissioner.15
Even if the Supreme Court declines to disregard the Adkins case on
the basis of the change in conditions since 1923, the conclusions reached
in that case need not determine its decision as to the validity of this
law; for the grounds upon which the District of Columbia law was declared
unconstitutional are irrelevant to the present Act. The opinion of Mr.
Justice Sutherland in the Adkins case constitutes a syllogism, the major
premise of which is: "Freedom of contract . . . is the general rule and
restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge
it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances."
The question before the Court, therefore, was whether such circumstances
existed in the case at hand. And a review of a few of the decisions which
had permitted exceptions to "the rule" convinced the majority of the
Court that the District of Columbia law resembled those which had been
refused judicial sanction more than those the constitutionality of which
had been upheld.16 But the reason which "perhaps more than any other"
impelled the Court to this conclusion was that, according to the terms
15. On administration of wage laws in general, see MINIMUM WAGE-.FIx1na
MACHINERY, International Labour Office, Geneva (1927).
16. Thus, Mr. Justice Sutherland did not directly afiswer the question
whether in this case "exceptional circumstances" justified the interferenco with
"freedom of contract." For a criticism of the opinion's method of determining
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 421254
1933] COMMENTS 1255
of the District of Columbia Act, it "extracts from the employer an arbi-
trary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no causal connec-
tion with his business, or the contract or work the employee engages to
do." The basis for the computation of the minimum wage was "not the
value of the services rendered, but the extraneous circumstance that the
employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her sub-
sistence, health and morals . . . The necessities of the employee are alone
considered and these arise outside of the employment, are the same when
there is no employment, and as great in one occupation as in another."
Moreover, the cost of living standard which the Act provided was con-
sidered "so vague as to be impossible of practical application with any
reasonable degree of accuracy." An analysis of the provisions of the
New York law reveals that one of these objections are applicable to it.
The terms of the Act are that "a 'fair wage' shall mean a wage fairly
and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of
service rendered." 17 In establishing a fair minimum wage the Com-
missioner and the wage board may be guided "by like considerations
as would guide a court in a suit for the reasonable value of services
rendered" Is in qwantum ieruit proceedings, and may consider "the wages
paid in the state for work of a like or comparable character by employers
who voluntarily maintain minimum fair wage standards." 10 Thus, the
New York law does not "extract" an "arbitrary payment." On the con-
trary, the method of determining a reasonable wage is one long familiar
to the courts.20 The "purpose" and "basis" of payment by the employer
has a direct "causal connection with his business" and is founded not
upon any "extraneous circumstances" but upon a test which Mr. Justice
Sutherland himself suggested,2' "the value of the services rendered" and
the ability of the employer to pay. Finally, the standard is not "vague"
but entirely capable of "practical application" with a very "reasonable
degree of accuracy." 22 For since the time of the enactment of the District
the minor premise of the syllogism, see Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum
Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HAnv. L. REv. 545.
17. Eberhard-Wald Bill, supra note 13, § 551.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Heublein v. Wright, 227 Fed. 667 (D. C. Md. 1915); Shira v. Carbon
Steel Co., 245 Fed. 589 (S. D. W. Va. 1917); Lillard v. Oil Paint and Drug
Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1905); Cotter v. Coatsville Boiler Works,
257 Pa. 411, 101 Atl. 744 (1917). Cf. Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139
Wash. 305, 246 Pac. 941 (1926) (in determining the reasonable wage for
stockholding employees the test was a comparison with wages paid in similar
plants for similar work). See Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 419.
21. "A statute requiring an employer to pay in money, to pay at prescribed
and regular intervals, to pay the value of the services rendered, even to pay
with fair relation to the extent of the benefit obtained from the service, would
be understandable." Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 559 (1923).
22. The time which Mr. Justice Sutherland recommended for testing the
economic value of a minimum wage law has now arrived. "No real test of
of Columbia statute, comprehensive analyses of the industrial and economic
arts have yielded techniques and devices for appraising the reasonable-
ness of a wage. Research has disclosed the ability of business to pay
wages, taking into consideration profits in the separate industries, the
effects of efficient management and industrial waste, and the general
influence of the business cycle upon purchasing power.23 The New York
Department of Labor has accumulated an adequate fund of statistical data
by which to evaluate the capacity of industry to pay wages and it hag
also recorded the progress of wages actually paid.
24
It was admitted in the Adkins case that "There is, of course, no such
thing as absolute freedom of contract. It is subject to a great variety of
restraints." And as examples of decisions in which such restraint has
been allowed the Court cited 25 four classes of cases: those dealing with
statutes fixing rates and charges to be exacted by businesses impressed
with a public interest; statutes relating to contracts for the performance
of public work; statutes prescribing the character, methods and time for
payment of wages; and statutes fixing hours of labor. The underlying
principle of all these cases is that the state may interfere in the terms
of a contract between private parties when there is such inequality of
bargaining power between them that "it is illusory to speak of liberty of
contract." 26 When the question is one of price fixing, "Regulation is
within a state's power whenever any combination of circumstances seri-
ously curtails the regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers
are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legis-
lature might reasonably anticipate serious consequences to the community
as a whole." 27 But the only bbsinesses to which this principle has been
applied are those which the Court has been able to label as "affected
with a public interest." 28 When the question is one of stipulating terms
in a labor contract, a field wherein it is generally recognized that "freedom
the economic value of the law can be had during periods of maximum employ-
ment, when general causes keep wages up or above the minimum; that will
come in periods of depression and struggle for employment." Id. at 560.
23. For an outline of the literature on the technology of wages, see
HAMILTON AND MAY, TnE CONTROL OF WAGES (1927) 175-180.
24. See the Annual Reports of the Industrial Commissioner and special
bulletins of the Department.
25. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 545-503 (1923).
26. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 417 (1914).
27. Stone, J., dissenting in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 360 (1928).
Cf. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 (1913); German Alliance Insurance
Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (1914); Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States,
280 U. S. 420 (1930); O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
282 U. S. 251 (1931); Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 53 Sup. Ct.
133 (1932) (upholding a North Dakota statute providing that threshing and
harvesting machines may be returned by farmers if unsatisfactory).
28. For a criticism of this doctrine see Hamilton, Affectation With Public
Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1089.
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of contract is a misnomer," 29 the courts hiave allowed legislatures to
impose upon the dominant party a variety of restraints. Thus, com-
mission merchants may be held liable for the just return on the sale of
milk; 30 payment of wages in advance may be prohibited by the state; 31
mechanics liens universally afford protection to the claims of material-
men; the National Bankruptcy Act gives to the worker a priority on
wages due; 32 a statutory requirement prescribing payment in money
instead of store checks has been upheld; 33 usury laws for the protection
of workers are valid; 34 a requirement for the payment of employees at
stated intervals is permitted; 35 prohibition of the assignment of unearned
wages has received judicial sanction; ^3 a legislative act requiring coal
to be measured for payment of miners' wages before screening is not an
unreasonable regulation; 37 and, finally, hours of labor may be regulated.39
Except for the decision in the Adkizs case these cases would seem to
offer compelling precedent for upholding the constitutionality of minimum
wage legislation. Particularly when the principle of a minimum wage
law is compared with laws regulating hours of labor, there appears, as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes, "no difference in the kind or degree
of interference with liberty . . . The bargain is equally affected which-
ever half you regulate." 39 But an analysis of the majority opinion re-
veals that even Mr. Justice Sutherland did not rest his decision upon
the distinction between hours of labor laws and any minimum wage law,
but specifically upon the objections he raised to the particular law under
consideration.40 The conclusion, therefore, that the above cases were
not binding precedent in the Adk-izs case cannot fairly be said to apply
to a law which is not open to any of those objections. Furthermore, the pro-
cess of collective bargaining incorporated in the New York law is a method
of wage-fixing which has received, since the Adtin case, extraordinary
29. Holmes, J., dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525,
571 (1923). The quotation is from Higgins, A New Province for Late and
Order (1915) 29 HARV. L. REV. 13.
30. People v. Perretta, 253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72 (1930).
31. Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169 (1903); Strathearn Steam-
ship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348 (1920).
32. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 104(4) (1926).
33. Knoxville v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 (1901), and cf. appellants' brief
in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 534 (1923).
34. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563 (1910).
35. Erie Rr. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914).
36. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225 (1911).
37. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (1909), and cf. appellants' brief,
supra note 33.
38. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S.
426 (1917).
39. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 569 (1923).
40. See id. at 553, where the Court emphasizes that its basic reasons for
distinguishing the cases "will be made to appear" when the particular act
is analyzed. See also, id. at 558, and see quotation from opinion, supra note 21.
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judicial sanction. For it assures to the interested parties equality of,
bargaining power and thus establishes rather than restricts freedom of
contract between them. Similar methods were adopted in the Railway
Labor Act of 1926 41 wherein it is stipulated that labor disputes are to
be settled by arbitration between an equal number of representatives of
the employers and employees. In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. V.
Railway Clerks22 a preservation of this system was considered so essential
to the maintenance of actual freedom of contract that the Court approved an
injunction against an attempted interference therewith. By making col-
lective bargaining between employer, consumer and employee mandatory,
the New York minimum wage law is merely attempting another means
of reifying the same principle.
43
The Court, therefore, has more than adequate grounds for upholding
the New York law either by distinguishing the Adkins case or by refusing
to recognize its decision in 1923 as binding under present day conditions.
It is to be hoped, however, that, in accordance with its more recent attitude
toward social legislation, 44 the Court will repudiate the very premises of
its former opinion. The theory that freedom of contract is the rule
against which a specific statute must be proved a proper exception should
now be accorded a "deserved repose." As a statement of the problem
of economic well-being it has been displaced by the premises of the opinion
in the O'Gorman case, 45 where it was declared that a statute must be
presumed to be valid and that the presumption will be conclusive unless
there is a recitation of facts showing that the evil did not exist or that
the legislative remedy vas inappropriate.46 The propriety of such a change
in the method of approach to constitutional questions, even though it may
involve overruling previously decided cases, 47 has been recognized since
the days of Taney.4 8 It is necessary today if "judicial authority" is to
41. 44 STAT. 579 (1926), 45 U. S. C. SuPP. VI § 154 (1932). See SToCIxrT,
THE ARBITRAL DETERMINATION OF RAILWAY WAGES (1928).
42. 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
43. See Hamilton, Collective Bargaining (1930) 3 ENCYC. Soc. Sax. 628.
44. See cases, articles and notes cited supra note 3.
45. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251
(1931).
46. See Hamilton, Freedom of Contract (1931) 6 ENoYC. Soc. Sci. 450, 454.
47. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U. S. 393, 405, 406, 407, and cases cited therein, n. 1 and 2. See also Fox
Film Co. v. Doyle, 286 U. S. 123 (1932); Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1237.
48. See The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 470 (U. S. 1849); Washington
University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439, 444 (U. S. 1869) (where Miller, J., speaks
of "questions touching the power of legislative bodies, which can never be
finally closed by the decision of a court"); Barden v. Northern Pacific Rr.
Co., 154 U. S. 288, 322 (1893) (where Field, J., says: "It is more important
that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of
the cases than consistent with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will
eventually stand hich bear the strictest examination and the test of experi-
ence"); Brandeis, J., supra note 47, at 407, 408 ("The Court bows to lessons
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continue to "depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which
it is supported." 49
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF THE NEW YORK
DAIRY INDUSTRY
IT seems paradoxical that governmental price fixing should be adopted to
meet the ills of the dairy industry in New York state. One would hardly
look to urban industrial New York for this direct legislation on agri-
cultural maladjustments.1 Nor would one expect such measures to be
necessary in dairy farming which has heretofore been regarded as the
most lucrative and stable source of farm income.2 It is equally surprising
that in the midst of an intense concern for those agricultural problems of
a national and international scope,3 the last resort of governmental action
in the market, price fixing, should come to the aid of the purely local
dairy industry of New York. Yet the very features which suggest these
paradoxes may be shown in reality to resolve them. In the first place,
the action of a single state could be effectively exerted over the major
part of the market.4 The fluid milk industry in New York is dominated
by the needs of New York city and the metropolitan area.5 Because of
the perishability of milk and high transportation costs, the supply must
of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in
the judicial function").
49. Taney, C. J., in The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 470 (U. S. 1849);
Brandeis, J., supra note 47, at 412-413.
1. Emergency Milk Control Act, N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 158, art. 25.
2. Consumers in this country annually pay approximately four billion
dollars for dairy products. The income to the farmer is normally greater
than his income from any other branch of farming. BARTL=rr, COOPERATION
IN MAR=KHING DAIRY PRODUCTS (1931) 1, 2. Since the war, and until very
recently, milk prices have been more favorable than prices of other farm
products. N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1932) No. 267, 9, 10. See Report of Legislative
Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry, Part II (hereinafter cited as
"Report") 23, 24a, 86, for the New York situation. The paging given is
from the mimeographed advance copy. The printed version may differ.
3. See Jennings and Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculturc (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 878. For an intensive description of a typical milk market, see
J. T. HORNER, THE DETorr MiLnL MARKET (1928) Mlich. Agr. Exp. Station
Special Bul. No. 170.
4. The territory supplying the metropolitan market, known as the New
York "milk shed," embraces the state of New York and parts of Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut and Massachusetts, but New York farmers
supplied in 1930 83% of the milk and cream consumed within the state.
Report, 13-18.
5. The metropolitan area consumes more than three-fourths of the total
quantity of milk and cream sold in all cities of 10,000 or more within the
New York milk shed. Id. at 12 et seq.
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be drawn from a nearby region. By increasing the costs of producing a
standard quality of milk, and discriminating against out of state produc-
tion,1 the urban milk regulations have tended further to confine the supply
to producers in New York state, who, in 1931, supplied 76% of the milk
and 80% of the cream for the metropolitan area.8  Such a restricted
milk shed furnishing the tremendous urban demand of industrial centers
has brought forth a substantial industry, with a total value of one billion
dollars. 9 The investments and interests involved would in a crisis shape
a problem attracting legislative action.
The greatest pressure for price fixing legislation came from the pro-
ducers.'0 Although the industry as a whole was affected by the general
fall in price levels and the reduced purchasing power of the consumer, the
6. Id. at 64 et seq.
7. This discrimination is made through the health inspection provisions.
Id. at 15, 17; AMERICAN COOPERATION (1932) 242, 246.
8. N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1932) No. 267, 139. The percentages were about the
same in former years, see N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1930) No. 241, (1931) No. 253,
but fell to 69% for milk and 77% for cream in 1932, Report, 15.
9. New York ranks third among the states in the production of milk and
second in the value of dairy products. Returns to the dairyman for milk and
its products averaged in 1927-1930 nearly 190 million dollars, which repre-
sented one-half the total agricultural income of the state. More than
$160,000,000 is invested in equipment for the handling and delivery of
milk. Another $116,000,000 is expended each year or labor, supplies,
transportation and taxes. It is estimated that in 1931 total net sales by
milk dealers amounted to $275,000,000. About half the dairy farms within the
state were mortgaged in 1931, and the indebtedness of $130,000,000 thus repre-
sented constituted about 40% of the value of the property mortgaged. In
addition, dairy farmers were in that year carrying a short-term indebtedness
of $30,000,000. The state and local bodies levy more than half their farm
property taxes on dairy farms. The shipping of milk and cream brings an
annual income of about $10,000,000 to the railroads of the state. The metro-
politan market consumes nearly 100,000 40-quart cans of milk daily, plus half
as much again in the form of crehm. N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1932) No. 267, 125;
Report, 7 et seq.
10. Commercial production of milk is carried on by about 84,000 individual
farmers with average herds of less than 20 cows. The independent un-
organized producers, numbering some 15,000, strenuously advocated the
measure. The Dairymen's League Co-operative (see infra note 17) opposed
such legislation, probably because it felt co-operation was the real way out
for the producers, and because it feared that the creation of a board would
consolidate the position of the distributors. See N. Y. Times, May 28, 1933,
IV, p. 2. Distribution is in the hands of efficient large-scale corporations which
can meet the high capitalization and overhead required by modern market
conditions. About 50% of the metropolitan retail market is controlled by
Borden's Farm Products Company and the Sheffield Farms Company. These
are owned respectively by holding companies, the first by The Borden Company
and the second by National Dairy Products Company. These form the two
largest dairy distributing systems in the country. Report, 213 ot seq., 240;
see note 32, infra.
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chief incidence thereof fell upon the producers because of their weakness
in the market." Three factors have combined to prevent the farmer from
overcoming this weakness: his failure to achieve comprehensive collective
action, the opposition of well-organized distributors, and the effects of
an ever-present surplus.
The existence of a surplus of milk above the amount required for fluid
consumption creates, as between the selling producer and the buying dis-
tributor, a buyers' market. The inelastic demand for fluid mill, which
must be satisfied, necessitates a minimum daily production, but from the
number of cows required to yield an adequate supply during the months
of least production there comes with the spring freshening an extremely
large seasonal excess. In recent years seasonal variations have consistently
ranged as high as 90% over the month of least production.'- This surplus
must go into manufactured products such as cheese, butter and condensed
milk where the milk has a much lower value thah that going into fluid
uses.13 However, the individual farmer does not send his milk to two
different markets, but rather delivers his whole production to a country
plant and the distributor makes a subsequent allocation according to the
relative needs of the two markets. 14 The actual price which the farmer
receives is therefore a composite of the value of both uses to the dis-
tributor. 15 The primary advantage which the distributor derived from
the existence of the surplus lay in his power to drive down the price he
11. The average price paid to producers for milk compared with a pre-war
base of 100 was 175 in March, 1929 and 77 in March, 1933. Id. at S6. The
farm price of milk, which since 1925 had been substantially above the general
price level, was in 1932 more unfavorable in comparison to that level than
in any previous recorded year. Milk prices had been since 1919 above the
level of prices for other farm products but in January, 1933 the difference
vanished. The 1932 farm value of dairy products was about one-half that
of 1929 and the return did not meet the cost of production. Id. at 23-38. For
the much milder effects of the depression upon the distributor, see note 29, infr .
12. Variations in consumption of fluid milk from the highest to the lowet
month in the New York market are less than 7% compared with average
consumption throughout the year. On the other hand, in 1927-1931 milk
deliveries to receiving stations by farmers have averaged 92% greater in June
than in November. See Barns v. Dairymen's League Cooperative Association,
Inc., 220 App. Div. 624, 627, 222 N. Y. Supp. 294, 290 (4th Dep't 1927);
BAf rT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 166 ct seq.; N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1932) No. 267,
67, 68, 108, 109; Report, 18 et scq., 35, 82-5.
13. BARTLMTT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 188; Report, 82, 84. The low prices
set by national competition for milk in surplus uses are particularly harsh from
the point of view of New York farmers, whose cost of production is above
that of areas in the Middle West. N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1932) No. 267, 10; Corn.
Univ. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bull. (1927) No. 459, 3.
14. Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., oupra note
12, at 628, 222 N. Y. Supp. at 297.
15. See Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., cupra
note 12; BARTni=, op. cit. supra note 2, at 190.
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had to pay for milk used in the fluid market.'( The necessity of meeting
the advantage enjoyed by the distributor was the motive force and object
of early collective action on the part of New York farmers.11 By 1921
the Dairymen's League Co-operative Association had attained a member-
ship of 50,000 farmers supplying 50% of the metropolitan market.18 In
that year, in an effort to deal with the problem of marketing an apparently
unavoidable surplus, the League adopted the so-called classified-use price
plan, which is still in effect. Under this arrangement the distributors
with whom it deals are required to make payments to the League on the
basis of an accurate record of the allocation of milk to its various uses;
the proceeds are pooled and each producer is paid for the quantity he
delivers on the basis of the average price for all milk sold by the associ-
16. See Barns v. Dairyman's League Co-operative Association, Inc., supra
mote 12; BARTLETT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19; AMERICAN COOPixATION (1932)
186; Report, 135. 1
17. Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., supra note
12. The first cooperative action in the milk industry was taken by distributors
of New York City who in 1882 organized in the Milk Exchange, Ltd., which
openly fixed prices to be paid to producers. After some legal difficulties, about
75 of the largest distributors formed the Milk Conference Board which today
effectuates a uniform policy towards producers by means of "gentlemen's
agreements." Meanwhile, in 1907, the producers formed the Dairymen's League,
Inc., and in 1916 when the distributors refused to grant an increase in price
the League ordered a milk strike which lasted a fortnight, until finally the
distributors agreed to the price increase. The same events were again repeated
in 1919; a strike of even greater proportions took place, which ended in the
same way. But no sooner had the League succeeded in gaining its price than
it was faced with a problem of much more serious import. The exaggerated
-wartime demand for condensed and evaporated milk suddenly collapsed, and
an immense supply of milk now pressed upon the fluid market and began to
nullify the price advances which the League had made. The latter found
that a mere bargaining association was insufficient to prevent its members
f-rom competitively forcing their milk upon the fluid market and thereby
threatening the very existence of the League. A new organization was formed,
the Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., which in a year or two
succeeded the old Dairymen's League, and is in operation today. The new
League is a "processing" as well as a collective bargaining association, for
it owns and operates over 300 country plants where it receives and ships its
members' milk. By means of the classification plan and its ownership of
-country plants, it is able to market its members' surplus without the danger
of complete disorganization of the fluid market. See, for full account, Report,
101-123. Shorter treatments may be found in Barns v. Dairymen's League
Co-operative Association, Inc., supra note 12; and in Booeri, FARMERs Co-
OPERATIVE BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS IN NEw YoRK (1926) 19-24. Legislation
'has been enacted aiding and encouraging co-operatives. N. Y. CO-OPERATIVE
CoRp. LAW (1930) §§ 105-128.
18. Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., supra note
12, at 634, 222 N. Y. Supp. at 301. The League handled in April, 1922, 40%
of the milk produced in the state of New York.
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ation."9 The League thus succeeded in putting into effect an accurate
price plan, but it has failed to overcome the primary advantage of the
distributor.20 For since the adoption of the plan, the League has been
unable to attract those producers who are unwilling to share collectively
the burden of the surplus and who hope individually to sell a greater
proportion of their milk for fluid use.21 Clearly, the Dairymen's League
could not effectively bargain for higher prices when the distributors still
had an alternative source of supply from unorganized producers. The
traditional resistance of the farmer to collective action 2 2 and the difficulties
presented by the surplus combined with the pressure exerted by distributors
in the form of counter propaganda and direct economic coercion 2 to
prevent complete co-operative organization.
Prior to 1929, the inherent weaknesses of the farmers' position were
obscured by a steadily rising demand. But with the decline in the pur-
chasing power of the consumer, the demand for fluid milk fell off and the
retail price was forced down.2 4  The consequent increased competition
between distributors reacted unfavorably upon producers' prices.2- Further-
more, at the same time that the demand decreased, the supply available
for the fluid milk market underwent a twofold increase. The greater
19. See BARTLETT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 197-205; Report, 114-123, 135-138.
The pooling contract was upheld as within the powers of agricultural co-
operatives but deductions for co-operative expenses were strictly limited by
'statutory powers of such associations. Dairymen's League Co-operative As-
sociation, Inc., v. Holmes, 239 N. Y. 503, 147 N. E. 171 (1924).
20. The president of the League expressly states that under the classified-
use plan "the dealer does not have to bear the burden of surplus. The pro-
ducers, through their association, bear the burden . . .' Report, 119, 173.
And see Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., cupra
note 12, at 632, 222 N. Y. Supp. at 300.
21. Prices paid to independent or company-union producers are consistently
higher than those paid to League members. It is suggestive to note that the
membership of 50,000 which the League had in 1922 is almost exactly identical
with that of today. See Report, 124, 204-211.
22. Report 199, 200, 202.
23. During the year preceding the enactment of the Milk Control Statute
about 1,000 farmers who engaged in efforts to form a "single, strong organi-
zation" were denied a market by the distributors to whom they had theretofore
delivered their milk. Distributors served notice through advertisements in
newspapers that producers who joined the new organization would lose their
market. Besides this method of intimidation, certain distributors spread
propaganda to the effect that the League was a price-cutting organization,
that it was heavily in debt and anxious to enlist new members to help pay off
the debt, etc. Report, 190, 192-199. Other practices of distributors are cited
in BART -RS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19. See Report, 199-211, for the factors
which explain the failure of dairymen to organize more completely.
24. Report, 79, 80. See also AimricAN CooPERATION, op. cit. supra note '7,
at 227-231.
25. All parties protected themselves from the fall in net sales by lowering
the price paid to the farmer. The inevitable effect of the price cutting was to
pull the price of fluid milk down towards the price of surplus. Report, 98, 99.
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number of productive cows in the state caused an absolute increase in
the total supply of milk,26 and, since the producers' price for milk going
into manufactured products plunged downward even more rapidly than did
the farm price for fluid milk, an unusual pressure was exerted which
forced upon the fluid market the milk normally going into surplus uses,
thereby making for a relative increase in the available supply.27 The
comparative effect of these trends upon producers and distributors provides
the background for the picture of milk strikes and rioting farmers.2 8
Between 1929 and 1932 the retail pri6e of milk declined from sixteen to
twelve cents. The distributor passed on to the farmer all of this four cent
decrease except six-tenths of a cent. While distributors earned profits
of 9.9% in 1931, producers were receiving less than the cost of production,
and by 1933 only half that cost.29
Within two years after the break in prices began the condition of the
New York dairymen induced the legislature to create a joint committee
to investigate the situation 3 and stirred the farmers to form an
"Emergency Committee of the New York Milkshed" looking to the estab-
lishment of an all-inclusive co-operative association. After a very thorough
investigation the legislative committee made findings and recommendations
on the basis of which the present statute was drafted. The "Emergency
Committee" in the course of a year held 3,100 meetings attended by
151,000 farmers and their families; secured from 10,000 farmers signed
agreements to join a "single, strong organization"; and exerted a steady
and at times violent pressure for relief measures.81
26. Report, 73-75, 89-93; 1 AMERICAN COOPERATION (1931) 269 et seq.; N. Y.
Agr. Bull. (1932) No. 267, 14, 56; id. (1931) No. 253, 13, 56.
27. N. Y. Agr. Bull. (1931) No. 253, 110; Report, 84.
28. Sporadic outbreaks of picketing and dumping milk from trucks took
place in the few weeks prior to the passage of the statute. See the newspapers
of March and April, 1933.
29. See Report, 95-97, 244b; cf. note 10, supra. Distributors' losses were
actually smaller than the table below indicates, since wages and other operating
costs were drastically reduced.
Table of Relative Losses by Farmers and Distributors.
Price Paid by Dealers Retail Price Distributors' Margin
Year for Fluid Milk 201-210 New York City Incl. Country landling
mile zone (Grade B) and Transportation
1929 7.4 16.0 8.6
1930 6.9 15.7 8.8
1931 5.9 14.7 8.8
1932 3.9 12.0 8.1
March 1933 2.8 10.0 7.2
Percentage Decline 61.6 % 37.5 % 17.2%
30. Joint Resolution of the Senate and Assembly, March 10, 1932, reprinted in
Advance Report, Part I, ii.
31. Report, 180-192.
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Meanwhile, the same factors which had made for chaos in the producers'
market had created a disturbance in the retail market. Although three
distributors controlled 67% of the metropolitan retail business, there
always existed a considerable degree of competition.-2  To the distributor
as well as the producer the milk going into surplus products yielded a
smaller return than that sold as fluid milk. Accordingly, the total cost
of his milk was a composite of the two values. The small distributor,
however, who carried no surplus could purchase milk from producers at
the same price as that paid by the larger dealers, and selling exclusively
in the fluid market, he could afford to cut prices. This advantage increased
as the size of the surplus drove down the "blended" price. When the
decline in purchasing power induced even keener competition among dis-
tributors for the restricted demand, the extraordinary surplus of the
last two years offered a ready supply of cheap milk which encouraged
further price-cutting. 33 In this situation the prospective milk bill afforded
the larger distributors an opportunity for the stabilization of the retail
market. What was originally designed to provide immediate relief to the
farmer became as well a vehicle for the protection of the distributor. 4
The Milk Control Statute recites the breakdown in the dairy markets
and declares that the milk industry is "a business affecting the public
health and interest." 35 It establishes a Milk Control Board with general
supervisory powers over the dairy industry throughout the state and
requires all distributors to secure licenses, which may be revoked for an
32. Id. at 214, 216, 240.
33. Normally, price-cutting flourishes in the spring and early summer,
-when the large surplus creates a wide difference bstween the fluid price and
the blended price received by League and Sheffield member producers. In the
fall months, usually, since the slender surplus results in only a narrow margin
between fluid and blended price, price-cutting does not thrive. In sales to
stores price-cutting was indulged in chiefly on Grade B and "loose ' (bulk)
milk. Report, 98-100, 125, 275, 308, 311, 318-320, 323.
34. The original draft declared that the board might fix minimum prices
to producers and maximum prices to consumers. N. Y. Times, April 0, 1033,
p. 16. "The milk distributors have maintained a powerful lobby at Albany
whenever their interests have been threatened. And it has been invariably
effective. On one occasion they fought a law which would have made it a
misdemeanor to pass off cocoanut oil as butter fat in cream or butter." N. Y.
Herald Tribune, May 10, 1933, p. 4.
35. Laws 1933, c. 158, art. 25, § 300. The milk industry has been strictly
regulated as to standard quality, and a licensing system has been the device
used to secure enforcement. Supervisory power has heretofore been vested
in the Department of Agriculture and Markets, N. Y. AGRICULTURD & M nxnrs
LAw (1930) §§ 22-58; and in local health bodies, N. Y. PuBLic HEALTH LAw
(1930) §§ 6-b, 21. These regulations have been upheld as an exercise of the
police power to protect the public health. People cx reL Liebermann v. Van
De Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905); People c. reL Lodes v. New York, 189 N. Y.




infraction of the provisions of the law or the orders of the Board.30 It
empowers the Board to fix the retail price of milk and, in case any increase
in price thereby effected is not passed along to the farmer, to fix the
producers' price.37 Finally, it makes unlawful the sale of milk purchased
from an out-of-state producer at a price less than that required to be
paid to farmers within the state.38
This attempt by a state to fix prices and protect particular interests is
according to the provisions of the statute to remain in force for the
emergency period of twelve months.3 9 The statute may therefore be upheld
on the sole ground that it is a necessary exercise of the police power in
an emergency,40 but otherwise the validity of the law is open to question.
There are two tests for the determination of the constitutionality of a
price-fixing measure. The first is by a comparison of the given instance
with past decisions in which price-fixing has been allowed or disallowed.41
According to such a test this direct regulation of the market in the milk
industry may well be unconstitutional. The dairy industry is not a public
utility,42 and the dicta of Mr. Justice Sutherland that it is not affected with
36. Laws 1933, c. 158, art. 25, §§ 302-311. The board may issue sub-
poenas for information (§ 303), and secure injunctions to enforce its orders,
while violations are made a misdemeanor (§ 307). The license shall be granted
to anyone complying with the several provisions (§ 308). It would seem that
the licensing does not represent any attempt to control production, and so does
not raise the issue of New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
Apart from the fact that the licensee must maintain the prices set, he is now
subject to substantially the same regulations as before, which have been
upheld, supra note 35. Even those provisions in the present statute holding
a dealer to a proper course of conduct and prohibiting fraud restate in stronger
terms former regulations of the dairy industry (AGRICULTURE: AND MARKETS
LAw (1930) § 55) which have been sustained as valid. People v. Beakes Dairy
Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115 (1918); People v. Perretta, 253 N. Y. 305,
171 N. E. 72 (1930).
37. Laws 1933, c. 158, art. 25, § 312.
38. Id. § 312 (f).
39. Id. § 319, which provides that on March 31, 1934 "the board shall be
deemed abolished and [its] powers . . . shall terminate."
40. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135
(1921); of. Marcus Brown Holding Company, Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170
(1921).
41. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 554 (1923); Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial 'Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1023); Tyson
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 451 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S.
350 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929); New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.- S. 262 (1932). For an especially penetrating
analysis, see Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
1089, 1101, 1103.
42. The milk industry has none of the customary features of a public
utility: natural monopoly, grant of franchise, etc. See Wolff Packing Co. v.




a public interest 4 3 support the conclusion that the extension of price-
fixing to the insurance business cannot serve as a precedent.1 4 However,
the statute may still be sustained on the ground that the elemental necessity
of an adequate milk supply to the public health places the dairyman in
a category with the insurer and distinguishes him from the grocer, the
butcher and the baker.4 5 The second test, proceeding pragmatically, looks
to the necessity and efficacy of the measure with respect to the particular
circumstances, and will uphold price-fixing if there exists a maladjustment
"materially restricting the regulative forces of competition." 40 From
the foregoing description of the dairy industry, it is clear that price
regulation is essential. The existence of a producers' surplus gives rise
to a continuil maladjustment which reaches serious proportions with
recurring depressions.4 7 The magnitude of the dairy industry makes
it of sufficient importance, and the handicaps of producers are of sufficient
moment, to affect the public welfare and justify governmental interven-
tion.48 The New York courts have definitely said that the producer in
his dealings with the distributor deserves special treatment from the
legislature.49 At the present moment, and until a comprehensive co-
43. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 277 (1932); see also
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 357 (1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton,
273 U. S. 418, 440 (1927); cf. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U. S. 522 (1923).
44. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914);
O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).
See Hamilton, supra note 41, at 1098, 1099. But see the able argument that
the milk industry has most of the elements of a public utility, in Manley, The
Constitutionality of Regulating Milk as a Public Utility (1933) 18 Core.
L. Q. 410.
45. People v. Perretta, supra note 36, at 311, 171 N. E. at 74; see Cofman
v. Osterhous, 40 N. D. 390, 400, 401, 168 N. W. 826, 828, 829 (1918), and
Manley, supra note 44.
46. See dissenting opinions in Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418,
451 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 360 (1928); Hamilton, cupra
note 41, at 1110.
47. The prices fixed to meet a producers' disadvantage will of course be
minimum prices to be paid by distributors. The fixing of minimum prices
has been upheld in the case of railroads, TRANSPORTATION Acr of 1920, 41
STAT. 488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. 15a (1926); Anchor Coal Co. v. United States,
25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928) [declared moot on other grounds, 279
U. S. 812 (1929)]; gas companies, Public Service Commission v. Great Northern
Utilities Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 546 (1933); motor trucks, Stephenson v. Binford, 53
Sup. Ct. 181, 188 (1932).
48. Knoxville v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 20 (1901); Patterson v. Bark
Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 175 (1903); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 550
(1909); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 233 (1911). See People
v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115 (1918), 179 App. Div. 942,
166 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1917); People v. Perretta, supra note 36.
49. People v. Perretta, supra note 36, at 310, 311, 171 N. E. at 73, 74;
Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., supra note 12,
at 638, 222 N. Y. Supp. at 305.
operative organization is achieved, the Milk Board must set minimum
prices to protect the producer and the milk supply. Should such an
organization arise, and thus equalize the market strength of producers
and distributors, the Board may still be necessary to protect the consumer
from excessive prices.
Once the constitutionality of the price-fixing feature of the act is suc-
cessfully established, then the fact that the statute involves no interference
with interstate commerce completely assures its validity. By forbidding
the sale of milk purchased from out-of-state producers at a price lower
than that required to be paid to producers within the state, the statute
does not discriminate against interstate commerce.50 Since the provision
applies only to milk sold within the state, the burden if any is indirect.61
And in the absence of federal legislation the New York legislature can
assuredly act to .prevent wholesale evasion of the statute by recourse to
unregulated markets.
The satisfactory operation of the statute depends upon whether the
Board can make a happy adjustment of the interests involved in the dairy
industry. As a result of the creation of the Board the consumer is now
forced to pay approximately two cents a quart more for his milk.52 Obvi-
ously, such would be the intended result of legislative relief for a dairy
industry afflicted with low prices. Presumably permanent regulation will
make for a relatively high price level but assure to the consumer a stable
and sufficient supply of sanitary milk. The chief benefits of stabilization of
the retail market, however, go to the distributor. The Board, aided by
voluntary action on the part of large distributors, has already taken steps
to prevent price cutting.53 Restricted price variations, however, are
permitted. The small distributor in New York City is still allowed the
advantage of a lower price, for the statute expressly permits the sale of
milk by "unadvertised" dealers at one cent per quart below the established
price.54 And prices may vary with the several localities and markets of
50. Packer Corporation v. State of Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 111 (1932) ; Sprolea
v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 390 (1932); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S.
472 (1932).
51. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 559 (1917); International
and Great Northern Railway Co. v. Anderson County, 246 U. S. 424, 434
(1918); Hump Hairpin Manufacturing Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 294
(1922); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 503 (1925).
52. See notes 59, 60, infra. Consumption varies with income groups, and
save for depressions when purchasing power is drastically reduced, price
changes have little effect upon consumption habits. See HORNER, op. Cit. stpU 
note 3; Waite and Howe, Consumption of Dairy Products in Six New Jersey
Townships (1930) N. J. Agr. Exp. Station, Bull. 506; U. S. Dep't. of Agri-
culture, Prelim. Report, Consumer Demand for Milk in Philadelphia (1924).
53. N. Y. Times, May 19, 1933, p. 9; May 23, p. 9.
54. § 317 (c). After a protest by the small distributors the Board, sup-
ported by an opinion by the Attorney General of the state, allowed stores to,
sell such milk to consumers at the lower price. N. Y. Times, April 16, 1933,
p. 16; April 19, p. 5; April 21, p. 9.
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the state.55 Since appeal may be had from any order of the Board, the
distributor may seek from the courts protection for his investment against
unreasonable prices.56
To the farmer substantial and immediate relief has come from the
operation of the statute in the form of increased prices for his product.
But as against this benefit it must be set down that the Board has thus
far failed to deal adequately with the problems of the surplus and the
distributor's spread. Were the Board to adopt the equalizing-value price
plan in place of the present classified-use plan, the evils of seasonal vari-
ations could be largely eliminated.57 It would seem that the Board bs
done nothing to diminish the distributor's spread. By the statute retail
prices were to be fixed first; only in the event that the increases were
not passed along to the farmers was the Board to set producers' prices.0'
In actual fact the Board's first act was to raise retail prices approximately
one cent a quart.5 9 Evideiitly the benefit derived from the increase was
not passed on to the farmer, for after one month the Board, under the
pressure of a threatened strike, fixed the producers' fluid milk price at
four cents, and incidentally raised the retail price one cent more.co It
would be a mistake to suppose that having gained a Milk Board the
farmers thereby gained full equality of bargaining power with the dis-
tributors. The most reliable estimates indicate that the present estab-
lished price is barely sufficient to cover the cost of production and pre-
sumably future minimum prices will do no more.0 ' The policy of the
Board, which has been and will be subject to pressure from distributors
55. § 312(a). The Board has responded by setting separate retail price
schedules for the metropolitan area and for the upstate district. N. Y. Times,
April 15, 1933, p. 3. The price schedule for payments to producers takes into
account freight differentials based upon distance from the market. N. Y.
Times, May 14, 1933, p. 1.
56. § 312(f). This raises the whole problem surrounding the concepts of
fair return and valuation, which must be left to future developments.
57. The Board has in effect extended the classified-use plan to all pro-
ducers in the milk shed and has taken steps to see that dealers make accurate
payment. See N. Y. Times, May 6, 1933, p. 5. To the individual producer,
this plan affords no incentive for uniform production. Under the equalizing-
value price plan, types of which are in operation in Pittsburgh and Detroit,
a total "basic" volume of production is fixed equal to the total fluid sales
of the market, and individual quotas apportioned thereon among the farmers.
By penalizing farmers for all production in excess of their quotas, seasonal
variations could be levelled out and surplus production over the whole year
to some extent discouraged. Such a plan would be most successful when used
in connection with a fairly comprehensive producers' organization. For a
discussion of price plans, see BARTLETt, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 13-19; RonNER,
op. cit. supra note 3; Report, 127.
58. § 312 (b) (c) (d).
59. N. Y. Times, April 15, 1933, p. 3.
60. N. Y. Times, May 13, 1933, p. 15. See also N. Y. Times, May 14,
1933, p. 1, 20; May 6, p. 5; May 7, p. 3; May 11, p. 5.
61. N. Y. Times, May 14, 1933, p. 20.
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as well as farmers, must be a compromise between the two interests and
can substantially do no more than reflect their respective strength. The
distributors on the whole are well organized, and the maintenance of
uniform retail prices should completely stabilize the market. Ultimately,
therefore, the dairyman if he wishes to make secure his interest must
achieve comprehensive voluntary cooperative action. The Milk Control
Board may well act as a focal point for the efforts of farmers to organize
more successfully. More effective aid to cooperative action could, however,
be secured by legislation compelling all producers to bear the burden of
surplus prices.62 In the final analysis, a group can extract no more
benefits from governmental action in its behalf than it has power to
compel.
62. Such a statute was passed in British Columbia (STAT. OF BRIT. COL.
1929, c. 20; see also 1930, c. 13, and 1931, c. 14). Farmers who had obtained
the higher prices of the fluid market were required to contribute a share of
their receipts to a committee which apportioned it equitably among the pro-
ducers who had received only surplus prices. The statute was declared invalid
by the Privy Council on the ground that by the British North America Act
of 1867 an indirect tax by a Province was ultra vires. Lower Mainland Dairy
Products Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy Limited, 148 L. T.
R. 300 (P. C. 1933). At present, however, relief in this country relies upon
price fixing. New Jersey has set up a Board to fix retail and producers'
prices. N. Y. Times, May 30, 1933, p. 17; price fixing agreements are being
negotiated in the Chicago market, id. p. 4; and producers in Wisconsin are
demanding price fixing, id. May 28, 1933, IV, p. 2.
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